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Where to Draw the Line between Reverse Engineering 
and Infringement: Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. 
Connectix Corp. 
 
Derek Prestin* 
 
Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. (“Sony”) produces and 
sells the Sony PlayStation (“PlayStation”),1 a small video game 
console with hand controls.  The PlayStation plays games on 
compact discs that are inserted into the console and displayed 
on a television screen.2  Sony owns the copyright on the 
software programs that operate the PlayStation known as the 
basic input-output system or BIOS.3  Connectix Corporation  
makes and sells a software program called Virtual Game 
Station.4  The Virtual Game Station program is a PlayStation 
emulator.5  It emulates the functioning of the PlayStation 
console on a regular computer.6  This allows computer owners 
to buy the Virtual Game Station software and play PlayStation 
games using their computer rather than use the PlayStation 
console.7  The Virtual Game Station program itself does not 
 
        *  J.D. candidate, University of Minnesota, 2002. B.S. Chemical 
Engineering, University of Minnesota, 1998.  B.A. Economics, University of 
Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 1999. 
 1. The PlayStation system consists of a console (essentially a mini-
computer), controllers, and software that allows three-dimensional games to 
be played on a television set.  See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix 
Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 (9th Cir. 2000).  The PlayStation console itself 
contains hardware components and software that is known as firmware that is 
written on to a read-only memory chip.  See id. 
 2. See id. at 598. 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. An emulator such as the Virtual Game Station allows a consumer to 
load the software onto a computer, insert a PlayStation game into the 
computer’s CD-ROM drive, and play the PlayStation game using the computer 
monitor.  The emulator emulates both hardware and firmware components of 
the Sony console.  See id. at 599. 
 6. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 598 
(9th Cir. 2000). The Virtual Game Station  does not play PlayStation games as 
well as Sony’s PlayStation does because there are sometimes compatibility 
issues with some games and some computer hardware.  At the time of the 
lawsuit, Connectix had marketed its Virtual Game Station for Macintosh 
computer systems but had not completed a version of the Virtual Game 
Station software for Windows PC’s.  See id. at 599. 
 7. See id. at 598. 
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contain any of Sony’s copyrighted material.8  However, in the 
process of producing the Virtual Game Station, Connectix 
repeatedly copied Sony’s copyrighted BIOS during a reverse 
engineering process that Connectix undertook to determine 
how the Sony PlayStation functioned.9  Sony brought a 
copyright infringement action against Connectix based upon 
Connectix’s copying of the BIOS software during the reverse 
engineering process.10   
During arguments for a preliminary injunction, Connectix 
admitted that it copied the copyrighted BIOS software during 
the development of the Virtual Game Station, but contended 
that doing so was protected as a fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 
107.11  The District Court for the District of Northern California 
held that: (1) wholesale copying of Sony’s BIOS code by 
Connectix, in order to develop emulation software, was not fair 
use and (2) Connectix would be enjoined from selling the 
Virtual Game Station, even though the finished emulator did 
not contain any copied code.12  The district court enjoined 
Connectix from selling the Virtual Game Station and from 
copying Sony’s BIOS software during development of any other 
emulator products.13  The district court impounded all copies of 
the Sony BIOS held by Connectix and all copies of works based 
upon or incorporating the Sony BIOS.14 
Connectix appealed the district court’s ruling.  The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held: “The intermediate 
 
 8. See id. 
 9. See id.  In order to reverse engineer the Sony BIOS Connectix 
engineers purchased a Sony PlayStation console and took the Sony BIOS from 
a chip inside the console.  The engineers then copied the BIOS into the RAM of 
a computer and observed the functioning of the Sony BIOS in conjunction with 
the Virtual Game Station hardware emulation software as that hardware 
emulation software was being developed.  See id. at 601. 
 10. See id. at 598. 
 11. See id. at 602. 
 12. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp.2d 
1212, 1224 (N.D.Cal. 1999).  In making its determination, the district court 
held that Connectix’s intermediate copying of Sony’s code did not result in a 
transformative end product designed to be compatible with the plaintiff’s code, 
but rather was used to create a complete substitute for the plaintiff’s work.  
See Katherine C. Spelman, Current Developments in Copyright Law 2000, in 
UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT LAW 2000, at 25, 104-05 (Practicing Law 
Institute ed., 2000).  The district court also determined that the intermediate 
copying was substantial. See id. at 105. 
 13. See Sony Computer Entm’t Inc., 48 F. Supp.2d at 1224. 
 14. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 602 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
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copies made and used by Connectix during the course of its 
reverse engineering of the Sony BIOS were protected [by] fair 
use, necessary to permit Connectix to make its non-infringing 
Virtual Game Station function with PlayStation games.”15 
The issue raised by the Ninth Circuit’s application of the 
fair use doctrine to Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. 
Connectix Corp. is whether the intermediate copying of 
software during the reverse engineering process should be 
considered fair use under the Copyright Act when the final 
product contains no infringing code.  The inappropriate 
extension of the fair use doctrine into an area in which it does 
not belong could leave software developers powerless to stop 
the use of their software by others to plunder profits that would 
otherwise belong to the software developer.  Alternatively, 
without the extension of the fair use doctrine into the area of 
reverse engineering, software developers may be able to receive 
copyright-like protection of functional elements of their 
software due to the fact that the functional elements of the 
software are not directly observable.  Therefore, a happy 
median must be found between these two extremes. 
This Comment discusses the holding of the Ninth Circuit 
in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp. and 
determines whether the holding was an appropriate application 
of the fair use doctrine to the creation of intermediate copies of 
software using the reverse engineering process.  The 
background section provides the necessary foundation 
regarding the fair use doctrine, the application of copyright law 
to software in general, and the cases leading up to Sony 
Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.  This 
comment proposes here that the Ninth Circuit correctly applied 
the fair use doctrine to the case at hand, but that allowing of 
reverse engineering of software under the fair use doctrine 
should not be extended further. 
 
I.   BACKGROUND 
 
A.   COPYRIGHT LAW AND FAIR USE 
 
Article I, Section 8, of the United States Constitution 
provides that “Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
 
 15. Id. at 599. 
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Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.”16  This Constitutional 
provision is set forth in the copyright and patent laws enacted 
by Congress.  Copyright law protects “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now 
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, 
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with 
the aid of a machine or device.”17  However, the Copyright Act 
excludes from copyright protection “any idea, procedure, 
process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, 
explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”18  As a result, 
the “mere fact that a work is copyrighted does not mean that 
every element of the work may be protected.”19  The protection 
of copyright law is limited to those aspects of the work—
generally termed expression—that display the author’s 
originality.20 
The primary purpose of copyright law is to increase the 
distribution of knowledge to the public.21  Copyright law is 
“intended to motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the 
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to 
The products of their genius after the limited period of 
exclusive control has expired.”22  The ultimate aim of the 
Copyright Act is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 
public good.”23  The exclusive rights conferred by the copyright 
law of the United States are designed to ensure that the 
contributors of knowledge receive a fair return for their 
 
 16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 17. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).  The types of works of authorship that are 
covered by copyright law include: (1) literary works; (2) musical works, 
including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any 
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual 
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.  See id. § 102(a). 
 18. Id. § 102(b). 
 19. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 838 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992) (citing Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 
(1991)). 
 20. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
547 (1985). 
 21. See id. at 545. 
 22. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984). 
 23. Id. at 432 (citing Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932)). 
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labors.24  In other words, the temporary monopoly created by 
copyright law is designed to reward individual authors in order 
to benefit the public as a whole.25  However, the monopoly 
privileges that Congress authorizes under the Copyright Act 
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a 
special private benefit.26 
Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a collection of 
exclusive rights to the owner of a copyright.27  In general terms, 
these rights include the exclusive right to publish, copy, and 
distribute the author’s work.28  A person that “violates any of 
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by 
sections 106 through 121 . . . is an infringer of the copyright.”29  
To prove copyright infringement, the plaintiff must show two 
elements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright and (2) copying of 
expression protected by the copyright.30  If infringement is 
found to have occurred, the plaintiff may receive damages, the 
defendant may be enjoined from future infringing activities, or 
the infringing articles may be impounded or destroyed.31  The 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights, however, are subject to 
certain statutory exceptions set forth in the Copyright Act.32 
Among these limitations is Section 107, which codifies the 
privilege of authors to make “fair use” of an earlier writer’s 
 
 24. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 546 (citing Twentieth 
Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
 25. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting)(citing Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156). 
 26. See id. at 429. 
 27. These rights include the right: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work 
in copies or phonorecords; (2) to prepare derivative works based upon the 
copyrighted work; (3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted 
work to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental lease, or 
lending; (4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic 
works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to 
perform the copyrighted work publicly; (5) in the case of literary, musical, 
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or 
sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and (6) in the case 
of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a 
digital audio transmission.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 28. See id. 
 29. Id. § 501(a). 
 30. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 48 F. Supp.2d at 1216 (citing Triad Sys. 
Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1335 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 31. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-504. 
 32. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-118. 
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work.33  The fair use doctrine has historically been a judge-
made exception to the exclusive rights of copyright law, but was 
codified in the 1976 Copyright Act.34  Fair use has traditionally 
been defined as “a privilege in others than the owner of the 
copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable 
manner without his consent.”35 
A rationale for the fair use doctrine has been articulated 
as: 
[An] author’s consent to a reasonable use of his copyrighted works 
[has] always been implied by the courts as a necessary incident of 
the constitutional policy of promoting the progress of science and 
the useful arts, since a prohibition of such use would inhibit 
subsequent writers from attempting to improve upon prior works 
and thus . . . frustrate the very ends sought to be attained.36 
Fundamentally, the traditional concept of fair use permits 
reasonable unauthorized appropriations from a prior work of 
another author when the use to which the material is put 
advances the public benefit in some way.37  However, the 
appropriation must not substantially impair the current or 
potential value of the first work.38  The rationale behind the fair 
use doctrine is that, “when the free flow of information is 
sufficiently vital, it should override the copyright holder’s 
interest in the exclusive control of the work.”39  The fair use 
defense “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the 
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very 
creativity which that law is designed to foster.”40 
The preamble of Section 107 gives examples of uses that 
may be considered fair, including “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom 
 
 33. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 34. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576 (1994). 
 35. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 
(1985) (citing H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 
(1944)).  See also Triad Sys. Corp., 64 F.3d at 1336 (citing Narell v. Freeman, 
872 F.2d 907, 913 (9th Cir. 1989)). 
 36. Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 549 (citing H. BALL, LAW OF 
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)). 
 37. See id. at 549-51. 
 38. See id. at 550. 
 39. Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. 
Supp. 356, 364 (E.D.Va. 1994) (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral 
Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1151-1152 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
 40. Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 
(9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. 
Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
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use), scholarship, [and] research.”41  Fair use requires a 
balancing of multiple factors “in light of the purposes of 
copyright.”42 Section 107 states: 
  In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular 
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the 
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of 
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.43 
The statutory factors set forth in Section 107 of the 1976 
Copyright Act are not exclusive, nor is any one factor 
determinative in fair use analysis.44  The statutory factors must 
be examined on a case-by-case basis45 and must be considered 
in light of the purpose of the fair use doctrine, which is “to 
prevent strict enforcement of the copyright law when its 
enforcement would inhibit the very Progress of Science and 
useful Arts that copyright is intended to promote.”46  Although 
the four statutory factors identified by Congress are not meant 
to be exclusive, they are especially relevant in determining 
whether use is fair.47  Other relevant factors may also be 
considered in a fair use analysis, if necessary, since fair use is 
an ‘equitable rule of reason’ to be applied in light of the overall 
purposes of the Copyright Act.48  The analysis under the fair 
use exception must not “be simplified with bright-line rules, for 
the statute, like the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case 
analysis.”49  In order to determine whether a defendant’s use of 
copyrighted material may be considered fair use, a court must 
consider each of the four statutory factors set forth in Section 
 
 41. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 42. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). 
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 44. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.  See also Harper & Row, Publishers, 
Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985); Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Pub. 
Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D. Mass. 1993). 
 45. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 549. 
 46. Rubin, 836 F. Supp. at 916 (internal quotation marks omitted)(citing 
Penelope v. Brown, 792 F.Supp 132, 136 (D.Mass. 1992)). 
 47. See Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 560. 
 48. See id.  See also Rubin, 836 F. Supp. at 916. 
 49. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. 
at 560). 
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107.50 
 
1.    The Purpose and Character of the Allegedly Infringing Use 
 
The first statutory factor that must be considered in a fair 
use analysis is the purpose and character of the use.51  Under 
this factor, the court must consider whether the alleged 
infringer’s work “merely supersedes the objects of the original 
creation, or instead adds something new, with a further 
purpose or different character, altering the first with new 
expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, 
whether and to what extent the new work is transformative.”52  
It is not required that a fair use be transformative, but “the 
more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may 
weigh against a finding of fair use.”53  Although transformative 
use of a copyrighted work is not necessary for finding a fair use, 
“the goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is 
generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.”54  
If  
the secondary use adds value to the original—if [copyrightable 
expression in the original work] is used as raw material, 
transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, 
new insights and understandings—this is the very type of activity 
that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the enrichment of 
society.55 
When analyzing the purpose and character of the alleged 
infringer’s use of a copyrighted work, a court often will begin by 
looking at the preamble of Section 107.  The preamble lists as 
being potentially fair uses, use “for purposes such as criticism, 
comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies 
for classroom use), scholarship, or research.”56  Although the 
 
 50. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. 
 51. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 52. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 455 n.40 (1984)). 
 55. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 
(2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1990)). 
 56. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(citing 17 U.S.C. § 107). 
2002] WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE: SONY COMPUTER 145 
 
categories listed in the preamble “have an ‘illustrative and not 
limitative’ function, . . . the illustrative nature of the categories 
should not be ignored.”57  The uses listed in the preamble 
“provide only general guidance about the sorts of copying that 
courts and Congress most commonly had found to be fair 
uses.”58  As a result, the fact that the use in question falls or 
does not fall under the examples given in the preamble is not 
dispositive. 
Courts usually consider three underlying factors in their 
examination of the purpose and character of the alleged 
infringer’s use of a copyrighted work for purposes of the fair use 
defense: (1) whether the use was productive; (2) whether the 
use was commercial; and (3) whether the alleged infringer’s 
conduct was proper.59  However, none of the three factors are 
determinative.60  Despite the fact that no one factor is 
determinative, some courts have argued that “the essence of 
character and purpose is the transformative value, that is, 
productive use, of the secondary work compared to the 
original.”61  A productive use of a copyrighted work is a use that 
“result[s] in some added benefit to the public beyond that 
produced by the first author’s work.”62  The productive use of a 
copyrighted work, though not determinative, normally favors a 
finding of fair use.63   
The crux of the commercial and non-commercial use 
distinction is “not whether the sole motive of the use is 
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.”64  A commercial use of copyrighted material 
does not make the use presumptively unfair; rather, 
 
 57. Id. (citing Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 78 
(2d Cir. 1997)). 
 58. Castle Rock Entm’t, 150 F.3d at 141 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577-
78). 
 59. See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D. Mass. 
1993). 
 60. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 
1530 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Rubin, 836 F. Supp. at 916 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City 
Studios, Inc., 464, 478 U.S. 417 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
 63. See Rubin, 836 F. Supp. at 916 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471, 561 U.S. 539 (1985)). 
 64. Harper & Row, Publishers, 471 U.S. at 562 (citing Roy Exp. Co. 
Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
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commercial use is but one of the factors that the court must 
weigh.65  A commercial purpose of the use of a copyrighted work 
does not alone defeat a fair use defense to copyright 
infringement action.66  Generally a commercial purpose of the 
use “tends to weigh against a finding of fair use.”67  However, 
where the use of the copyrighted work was an intermediate one 
only, any resulting commercial exploitation of the work was 
indirect or derivative and the commercial use weighs less 
heavily against a finding of fair use.68 In their examination of 
commercial use, courts are free to consider any public benefit 
resulting from a particular use regardless of the fact that the 
alleged infringer made commercial use of the copyrighted 
material.69  The benefit to the public need not be direct or 
tangible, but the challenged use of the copyrighted work must 
serve the public interest.70 
 
2. The Nature of the Copyright Work Used by the Alleged  
 Infringer 
 
The second statutory factor “calls for recognition that some 
works are closer to the core of intended copyright protection 
than others, with the consequence that fair use is more difficult 
to establish when the former works are copied.”71  The court’s 
inquiry under this factor concerns whether the plaintiff’s work 
is primarily creative as opposed to informational; the defense of 
fair use has been given greater reach when the work copied is 
informational in nature.72  Beyond this, the court should not 
consider the contents of the copyrighted work, even if the court 
 
 65. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994).  The 
Supreme Court expressly rejected the irrebutability of the presumption 
against fair use in commercial contexts in Campbell when the Supreme Court 
flatly reversed the Sixth Circuit for making just such a presumption. 
 66. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 
724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Triangle Publications, Inc. v. 
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 67. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585. 
 68. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 69. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 
1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d 
Cir. 1981)). 
 70. See id. 
 71. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586. 
 72. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 
1536 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
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finds the material objectionable.73  Works such as works of 
fiction receive greater protection than factual works and works 
which have strong factual elements, such as historical or 
biographical works.74  Factual works, such as biographies, 
reviews, factual compilations, criticism, and commentary, are 
“believed to have a greater public value and, therefore, uses of 
them may be better tolerated by the copyright law.”75  To the 
extent that the copyrighted work is “functional or factual, it 
may be copied, as may those expressive elements of the work 
that ‘must necessarily be used as incident to’ expression of the 
underlying ideas, functional concepts, or facts.”76 
 
3.   The Amount and Substantiality of the Portion of the Work  
 Used by the Alleged Infringer 
 
The third statutory factor considers the amount of the 
copyrighted work copied by the alleged infringer and the 
substantiality of the portion copied.77  “There are no absolute 
rules as to how much of a copyrighted work may be copied and 
still be considered a fair use.”78  Therefore, the third statutory 
factor considers “not only the percentage of the original used 
but also the ‘substantiality’ of that portion to the whole of the 
work; that is, courts must evaluate the qualitative aspects as 
well as the quantity of material copied.”79  “The court must 
weigh the significance of the copying both in terms of the 
quantity and quality of the alleged infringement.”80  In other 
words, the court must take into account how much of the 
copyrighted work was taken and whether that portion was an 
 
 73. See id. 
 74. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
 75. Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp. 758 F. Supp. 1522, 1533 
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96 (2d 
Cir. 1987)). 
 76. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 
1992) (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-04 (1879) (internal quotations 
and citations omitted)). 
 77. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1994). 
 78. Maxtone-Graham, 803 F.2d at 1263. 
 79. Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1533 (citing New Era Publ’ns v. Carol 
Publishing Group, 904 F.2d 152, 158 (2d Cir. 1990)). 
 80. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 
1537 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 
1983)). 
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essential element of the plaintiff’s work.81  In general, the 
greater the amount of the copyrighted work used, the less likely 
it is that the fair use exception is applicable.82  However, even 
the copying of an entire work does not preclude fair use,83 
although it does weigh against a finding of fair use.84  As a 
result, questions of fair use often turn on qualitative 
assessments of the content copied.85  A small portion “which is 
‘the heart of’ a work may not be fair use and a longer piece 
which is pedestrian in nature may be fair use.”86  However, in a 
case of intermediate infringement where the final product does 
not contain infringing material, this factor is of “very little 
weight.”87 
 
4. The Effect of the Alleged Infringer’s Use upon the Potential  
 Market for the Copyrighted Work 
 
The final statutory factor is “the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”88  This 
factor takes into account “not only the extent of market harm 
caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but 
also whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort 
engaged in by the defendant . . . would result in a substantially 
adverse impact on the potential market for the original.”89  Fair 
use of a copyrighted work, when properly applied, is “limited to 
copying by others which does not materially impair the 
marketability of the work which is copied.”90  This factor has 
 
 81. See id. (citing Marcus, 695 F.2d at 1176). 
 82. See Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll. v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 153 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983) (citing Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756 
(9th Cir. 1978)). 
 83. See Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1984). 
 84. See Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., 845 F. Supp. at 366.  See also 
Sundeman v. Seajay Soc’y, Inc., 142 F.3d 194, 205 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing 
Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., 845 F. Supp. at 365-66). 
 85. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1263 (2d Cir. 
1986). 
 86. Basic Books, 758 F. Supp. at 1533. 
 87. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526-27 (9th 
Cir. 1992) 
 88. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1994). 
 89. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) 
(quoting M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A][4], 
at 13-102.61 (1993)). 
 90. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566-
67 (1985) (citing M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 
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been said to be “undoubtedly the single most important 
element of fair use.”91  Analysis of the effect on the market for a 
copyrighted work requires a balancing of the benefit that the 
public will derive if the use is permitted against personal gain 
that the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied.92  A 
possibility of harm to the copyrighted work arises if the 
defendant’s use would tend to diminish the sales of the 
plaintiff’s work, interfere with its marketability, or fulfill the 
demand for the original.93  In simple terms, the use of a 
protected work that destroys the value of the copyrighted work 
to the copyright holder cannot be considered fair.94  “[A] work 
that merely supplants or supersedes another is likely to cause a 
substantially adverse impact on the potential market of the 
original, [but] a transformative work is less likely to do so.”95  
Therefore, there is a presumption that market harm will occur 
when there is direct duplication for a commercial purpose, but 
there is no presumption or inference of market harm that is 
applicable to cases involving something other than mere 
duplication for commercial purposes.96 
The inquiry into the final statutory factor “must take 
account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the 
market for derivative works.”97  A derivative work is defined as 
“a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a 
translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, 
fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art 
reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.”98  Even 
though “derivative works that are subject to the author’s 
copyright transform an original work into a new mode of 
 
1.10[D], at 1-87 (1984)). 
 91. Id. at 566 (citing M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, 
§ 13.05[A], at 13-76 (1984)). 
 92. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 93. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 
1539 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (citing Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 
542 F. Supp. 1156, 1169 (W.D.N.Y. 1982)). 
 94. Ass’n of Am. Med. Coll., 571 F. Supp. 144, 153 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (citing 
Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1069-71 (2d Cir. 1977)). 
 95. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 607 (Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 591 (1994)). 
 96. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591. 
 97. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 568 
(1985) (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 621 
F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 98. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
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presentation, such works—unlike works of fair use—take 
expression for purposes that are not ‘transformative’.”99  
Markets for derivative works are those markets “that creators 
of original works would in general develop or license others to 
develop.”100 
Even if the copying in question results in an adverse 
impact on the potential market for the original work, fair use is 
not precluded if the use “simply enables the copier to enter the 
market for works of the same type as the copied work.”101  This 
is because an “attempt to monopolize the market by making it 
impossible for others to compete runs counter to the statutory 
purpose of promoting creative expression and cannot constitute 
a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair 
use doctrine.”102 
 
B.  COPYRIGHT PROTECTION OF SOFTWARE PROGRAMS 
 
The issue of the scope and strength of copyright protection 
of computer programs has been extremely important in recent 
years, primarily due to the increase in the size and importance 
of the software industry.  Courts have found it increasingly 
difficult to address the copyright issues surrounding the 
protection of software because of the idea/expression duality 
inherent to software programs. 
The issues surrounding the protection of computer 
programs under copyright law are particularly difficult to deal 
with because “computer programs are, in essence, utilitarian 
articles—articles that accomplish tasks.”103  As a result, “they 
contain many logical, structural, and visual display elements 
that are dictated by the function to be performed, by 
considerations of efficiency, or by external factors such as 
compatibility requirements and industry demands.”104  
Although “there are certainly creative aspects within any 
particular program, there are also those functional aspects 
 
 99. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 143 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 100. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592. 
 101. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 102. See id. at 1523-24. 
 103. Id. at 1524. 
 104. Id. (citing Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 705-08 (2d 
Cir. 1992)). 
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necessary to perform the given task which will not enjoy 
copyright protection.”105  Courts generally have come to the 
conclusion that “the literal elements of computer programs, i.e., 
their source and object codes, are the subject of copyright 
protection.”106  Therefore the object code107 of a program may be 
copyrighted as expression,108 but the ideas and functional 
elements contained in the object code are not entitled to 
copyright protection.109  As a result, when there has been literal 
copying of a copyrighted program, there is no question that 
copyright infringement has occurred.  The defendant is then 
liable for that infringement unless the copying falls within the 
fair use doctrine.  On the other hand, when there has been no 
literal infringement of the computer program the question of 
whether or not infringement actually occurred is more 
complicated.  As a result, courts must look to certain tests to 
determine whether the copyright of a program was infringed 
upon. 
One test used by courts to determine whether infringement 
has occurred in a software copyright infringement case is the 
“abstraction-filtration-comparison” test.110  In this approach, the 
court first looks at the “abstraction” of the computer program, 
which is a breakdown of “the allegedly infringed program into 
its constituent structural parts.”111  Next, the court examines 
“each of these parts for such things as incorporated ideas, 
expression that is necessarily incidental to those ideas, and 
elements that are taken from the public domain”112 and would 
eliminate all non-protectable material from consideration of 
infringement.  Finally, the court would compare the allegedly 
infringed program with the allegedly infringing program and 
determine if infringement in fact had occurred.113 
The Ninth Circuit, in Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v. 
 
 105. DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183, 
1190 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, 49 F.3d 807, 
815-19 (1st Cir. 1995)). 
 106. Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 107. Object code is the binary code of the computer program that the 
computer “runs” when it executes the program.  Object code cannot be read by 
humans.  See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 602. 
 108. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1994). 
 109. See id. § 102(b). 
 110. See Computer Assoc. Int’l, 982 F.2d at 706-12. 
 111. Id. at 706-07. 
 112. Id. 
 113. See id. at 710. 
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Penguin Books USA, Inc., developed a similar test referred to 
as the “extrinsic-intrinsic” test.114  The court first used “analytic 
dissection to determine the scope of copyright protection before 
[the] works are considered ‘as a whole.’”115  Analytic dissection 
looks at each element of each work in isolation from all of the 
other elements, combinations of elements, and expression of 
elements within the program.116  The court then determined 
whether there was a similarity of ideas between the two 
programs in question, the extrinsic portion of the test.117  The 
second part of the test, the intrinsic portion, asked “if an 
‘ordinary reasonable person’ would perceive a substantial 
taking of protected expression.”118  Using these two parts of the 
test, the court then determined whether the copying of the 
portions of the computer program in question constituted 
infringement. 
In some cases, even the direct, literal copying of a 
computer program may be allowed under the fair use doctrine.  
Since the object code cannot be read by humans, the 
“unprotected ideas and functions of the code . . . are frequently 
undiscoverable in the absence of investigation and translation 
that may require copying the copyrighted material.”119  Even if 
a software developer’s final product does not contain copied 
computer code, oftentimes the developer must use reverse 
engineering to determine how a particular computer program 
functions.  In such a case, intermediate copies of the computer 
program must be made in computer memory or in some other 
form, such as a printout of disassembled code.  Such 
intermediate copying may constitute copyright infringement 
even when the end product did not itself contain copyrighted 
material,120 but the intermediate copying could also be 
protected as a fair use if it was necessary to gain access to the 
 
 114. See Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 
1398 (9th Cir. 1997).  See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 115. See Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1398 (quoting Apple Computer Inc. 
v. Microsoft Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442-43 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 116. See Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1398 n.3. 
 117. See id. at 1398.  See also Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., 562 
F.2d at 1164. 
 118. Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1398. See also Sid & Marty Krofft 
Television Prods., 562 F.2d at 1164. 
 119. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 602. 
 120. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1519 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
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functional elements of the software itself.121  Where there is a 
legitimate reason for a developer to study or examine the 
unprotected functional aspects of a copyrighted program and 
there are no other means to do so, the disassembly of the 
program involved is considered a fair use under the fair use 
doctrine.122 
 
C. REVERSE ENGINEERING 
 
“Reverse engineering is the process of starting with a 
finished product and working backwards to analyze how the 
product operates or how it was made.”123  Software developers 
designing a program that “must be compatible with a 
copyrighted product frequently must ‘reverse engineer’ the 
copyrighted product to gain access to the functional elements of 
the copyrighted product.”124  During the manufacture of a 
computer program, a program written in source code by a 
programmer is translated into object code using a computer 
program called an assembler or compiler, and then copied onto 
some type of storage medium, such as a silicon chip, a compact 
disk, or a floppy disk.125  Devices or programs called 
disassemblers or decompilers can reverse this process by 
interpreting the electronic signals that are produced while the 
program is being run, “storing the resulting object code in 
computer memory, and translating the object code into source 
code.”126  The devices that assemble and disassemble programs 
are widely available and are commonly used within the 
software industry.127  There are four typical ways to reverse 
engineer a piece of software: (1) read about the program in 
available literature; (2) observe the program in operation by 
using it on the computer and observing the output on the 
computer screen; (3) perform a static examination of the 
instructions contained within the program; or (4) perform a 
 
 121. See id. at 1524-26. 
 122. See id. at 1527-28. 
 123. Secure Servs. Tech., Inc. v. Time & Space Processing, 722 F. Supp. 
1354, 1361 n.16 (E.D. Va. 1989). 
 124. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 599 (citing Andrew Johnson-Laird, 
Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 843, 
845-46 (1994)). 
 125. See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1514 n.2. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See id. 
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dynamic examination of instructions as the program is being 
run on a computer.128 
In the first method of reverse engineering, the developer 
gathers and reads all available literature regarding the 
computer program, such as the documentation included with 
the program and any other documentation available from the 
software’s manufacturer.  This method of reverse engineering is 
the least effective, because “[d]ocumentation, by its very nature 
and the manner of its production, is always incomplete, 
inaccurate, and out-of-date when compared to the actual 
software itself.”129 
The second, third, and fourth methods require the 
developer seeking access to the program code to load the target 
program onto a computer, an activity “that necessarily involves 
copying the copyrighted program into the computer’s random 
access memory or RAM.”130  The second method of reverse 
engineering, observation of the program while being run, may 
take several forms.131  The “ideas and functional concepts 
underlying many types of computer programs, including word 
processing programs, spreadsheets, and video game displays, 
are readily discernible without the need for disassembly, 
because the operation of such programs is visible on the 
computer screen.”132  In such cases it is relatively easy for a 
person to observe the external expression of the object code and 
determine how the object code operates.133  The functional 
elements of other programs that run in the background, such as 
basic input-output system programs and operating systems, 
cannot be readily be seen during the operation of the program 
because they create little or no helpful display on the computer 
screen.  One of the other methods used to observe the operation 
of these programs is to run the program in an emulated 
environment and observe the operation of the program through 
the use of another program known as a “debugger.”134 However, 
 
 128. See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real 
World, 19 U. DAYTON L. REV. 843, 846 (1994). 
 129. Id.  This can clearly be seen by the fact that most software programs 
include a “Readme” file, or a similar file, that contains all of the errors in and 
changes made to the documentation of the program after the manual was 
made. 
 130. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 600. 
 131. See id. 
 132. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1520. 
 133. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 600. 
 134. See id. 
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regardless of the method of observation used, “[t]he software 
program is copied each time the engineer boots up the 
computer, and the computer copies the program into RAM.”135  
Therefore, a direct copy is made of the computer program, but 
all the copying may be intermediate; that is, the final product 
may not contain any of the copyrighted material.136 
The third and fourth methods of reverse engineering 
constitute true disassembly of the object code into source 
code.137  The “need to disassemble object code arises only in 
connection with operations systems, system interface 
procedures, and other programs that are not visible to the user 
when operating—and then only when no alternative means of 
gaining an understanding of those ideas and functional 
concepts exists.”138  When using either of these methods, 
developers use a disassembler “to translate the ones and zeros 
of binary machine-readable object code into the words and 
mathematical symbols of source code.”139  This translated 
source code is similar to, but not exactly the same as, the 
original source code since it does not contain the annotations 
added by the program that explain the functioning of the source 
code.140  In the third method of reverse engineering, the static 
examination of computer instructions, a developer disassembles 
the object code for all or part of the program without running 
the program itself.141  During this process, the program usually 
has to be copied one or more  times to facilitate disassembly.142   
In the fourth method of reverse engineering, dynamic 
examination of computer instructions, a developer uses a 
disassembler to disassemble a part of the program, one set of 
instructions at a time, while the program is in operation.143  
Like the third method, this method requires that several 
intermediate copies of the program be made.  The particular 
number of copies that are made during this process depends 
upon how the disassembly is completed.  As a result, during the 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See id. 
 138. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 139. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 600. 
 140. See id.  Software is generally written by programmers in source code 
format and then compiled into object code. 
 141. See id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. See id. 
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reverse engineering of a program using the third or fourth 
methods, a direct copy is made of the computer program, but all 
the copying is intermediate.144 
 
II.   CASE DESCRIPTION 
 
In reaching its decision in Sony Computer Entertainment, 
Inc. v. Connectix Corp., the Ninth Circuit looked at the four 
factors listed in Section 107: (1) the purpose and character of 
the use; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the effect of the 
use upon the potential market.145  The court first determined 
that Sony owned a valid copyright for its BIOS code146 and, 
based upon Connectix’s admission, that copying had occurred.147  
The Ninth Circuit then went on to analyze each factor in 
Section 107 in turn. 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the repeated 
intermediate copying of Sony’s BIOS, in order to observe its 
operation, was necessary to access unprotected elements of the 
program for purposes of fair use analysis.  The court also 
concluded that the large numbers of copies made by Connectix 
did not weigh heavily against fair use, even though Connectix 
could have made fewer copies by disassembling the entire 
BIOS.148  The court first determined that the trial court erred in 
holding that Connectix’s commercial purpose in copying the 
Sony BIOS resulted in a “presumption of unfairness that . . . 
can be rebutted by the characteristics of a particular 
commercial use.”149  Instead, the court stated that the correct 
legal standard was that a commercial purpose is only a 
“separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair 
use.”150  The court found that Connectix’s commercial use of the 
copyrighted material from Sony’s BIOS was an intermediate 
one, and “thus was only indirect or derivative.”151  The court 
 
 144. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 600. 
 145. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. 
 146. See  Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 599 
(9th Cir. 2000). 
 147. See id. at 602. 
 148. See id. at 603-05. 
 149. Id. at 606. 
 150. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 585 (1994). 
 151. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 607 (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. 
Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
2002] WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE: SONY COMPUTER 157 
 
determined that “Connectix reverse-engineered the Sony BIOS 
to produce a product that would be compatible with games 
designed for the Sony PlayStation,”152 a purpose that has been 
recognized “as a legitimate one under the first factor of the fair 
use analysis.”153  The court went on to find that Connectix’s 
Virtual Game Station was “modestly transformative,”154 in 
contrast to the district court’s holding that Connectix’s 
intermediate copying of Sony’s BIOS code did not result in a 
transformative end product designed to be compatible with the 
plaintiff’s code, but instead was assigned to create a substitute 
for the Sony’s work.155  The court determined that: 
[t]he product creates a new platform, the personal computer, 
on which consumers can play games designed for the Sony 
PlayStation.  This innovation affords opportunities for game play 
in new environments, specifically anywhere a Sony PlayStation 
console and television are not available, but a computer with a CD-
ROM drive is.  More important[ly], the Virtual Game Station itself 
is a wholly new product, notwithstanding the similarity of uses and 
functions between the Sony PlayStation and the Virtual Game 
Station.  The expressive element of software lies as much in the 
organization and structure of the object code that runs the 
computer as it does in the visual expression of that code that 
appears on a computer screen.156 
The Virtual Game Station itself contained no code that 
infringed on Sony’s copyright.157  Therefore, the court was “at a 
loss to see how Connectix’s drafting of entirely new object code 
for its [Virtual Game Station] program could not be 
transformative, despite the similarities in function and screen 
output.”158  Based on these findings, the Ninth Circuit held that 
this factor favored Connectix.159 
The Ninth Circuit then looked at the nature of Sony’s BIOS 
in the realm of copyright.  The court determined that Sony’s 
BIOS fell at a distance from the core of copyright protection 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. (citing Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1522). 
 154. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606. 
 155. See  Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 
1212, 1219-20 (N.D.Cal. 1999) 
 156. Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 606 (9th 
Cir. 2000) 
 157. See id. 
 158. Id. at 606-07. 
 159. See id. at 607. 
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because it contained unprotected aspects that could not be 
examined without copying.160  Therefore, the court accorded 
Sony’s BIOS a “lower degree of protection than more traditional 
literary works.”161   
Although Sony’s BIOS contained unprotected functional 
elements, Connectix could not gain access to the unprotected 
elements without copying the Sony BIOS.162  There was little 
publicly available technical information about the functionality 
of the Sony BIOS and, since Sony’s BIOS was an internal 
operating system, the functioning of the program did not 
produce a screen display that could be observed.163  In order to 
gain access to the functional elements of the BIOS, Connectix 
was required to access the elements “through a form of reverse 
engineering that required copying the Sony BIOS onto a 
computer.”164  Connectix employed several methods of reverse 
engineering, namely observation and observation with partial 
disassembly, “each of which required Connectix to make 
intermediate copies of copyrighted material.”165  However, the 
court determined that “[n]either of these methods renders fair 
use protection inapplicable.”166  In addition, the court 
determined that the specific method of reverse engineering was 
irrelevant because “intermediate copying is the gravamen of 
the intermediate infringement claim, and [because] both 
methods of reverse engineering require it, [the court found] no 
reason inherent in these methods to prefer one to another as a 
matter of copyright law.”167   
The court dismissed Sony’s argument that Connectix’s 
creation of more intermediate copies than would have been 
required by different methods of reverse engineering should 
cause this factor to weigh against fair use because the necessity 
that was “addressed in Sega was the necessity of the method, 
i.e. disassembly, not the necessity of the number of times that 
method was applied.”168  The court determined that the district 
 
 160. See id. at 603 (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 
1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 161. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 603 (quoting Sega Enters., 977 
F.2d at 1526). 
 162. See id. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 603. 
 167. Id. at 604. 
 168. Id. at 605 (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 
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court erred in finding that this factor favored Sony because 
“[w]ithin the limited context of a claim of intermediate 
infringement, [the court found] the semantic distinction 
between ‘studying’ and ‘use’ to be artificial, and decline[d] to 
adopt it for purposes of determining fair use.”169  Based on these 
findings, the Ninth Circuit found that this factor favored 
Connectix since the “intermediate copying in this manner was 
‘necessary’.”170 
In its analysis of the amount and substantiality of 
Connectix’s use, the Ninth Circuit found that Connectix had 
disassembled portions of the Sony BIOS and copied the entire 
program multiple times.171  Therefore, the court determined 
that this factor favored Sony and weighed against a finding of 
fair use.172  However, the court also held that “in a case of 
intermediate infringement when the final product itself does 
not itself contain infringing material, this factor is of ‘very little 
weight’.”173 
The final factor that the Ninth Circuit looked to in its fair 
use analysis of Connectix’s copying of Sony’s BIOS was the 
effect on the market for the Sony PlayStation.  The Ninth 
Circuit determined that the Virtual Game Station did not 
merely supplant Sony’s game consoles, despite the similarities 
between the operation of the program and the hardware 
console, but instead created a whole new platform for 
PlayStation games.174  The court concluded that it was possible 
that Sony will lose console sales and profits due to the sale of 
the Virtual Game Station.175  However, since the Virtual Game 
Station was transformative, and “does not merely supplant the 
PlayStation console, the Virtual Game Station is a legitimate 
competitor in the market for platforms on which Sony and 
Sony-licensed games can be played.”176  Therefore, “some 
economic loss by Sony as a result of this competition does not 
compel a finding of no fair use.”177  The Ninth Circuit 
 
1524-26 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
 169. Id. at 604. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606. 
 172. See id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See id. at 606-607. 
 175. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 607. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
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determined that, although Sony was likely to lose sales as a 
result of the introduction of the Virtual Game Station on the 
market, this factor favored a finding of fair use because the 
Virtual Game Station was a legitimate competitor in the 
market for platforms on which PlayStation games could be 
played.178 
The Ninth Circuit found that three of the statutory fair use 
factors favored Connectix, while one favored Sony and that 
factor was “of little weight” because the final product contained 
no infringing code.179  The Ninth Circuit determined that 
“Connectix’s intermediate copying of the Sony BIOS during the 
course of its reverse engineering of the product was a fair use 
under 17 U.S.C. § 107, as a matter of law.”180  In addition, the 
court concluded “there is a legitimate public interest in the 
publication of Connectix’s software.”181  The Ninth Circuit 
concluded that the intermediate copying of Sony’s BIOS was 
necessary to access unprotected functional elements of the 
BIOS and was a fair use. 
As a result of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, a process that is 
widely used within the software industry, and whose legality 
had yet to be determined, was found to be a fair use of 
copyrighted material.  The court’s holding reiterated and 
clarified the court’s prior decision in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. 
Accolade, Inc.,182 which held that “[w]here there is good reason 
for studying or examining the unprotected aspects of a 
copyrighted computer program, disassembly for purposes of 
such study or examination constitutes a fair use.”183  The Ninth 
Circuit’s holding in Sega left open the possibility that the use of 
disassembly or an equivalent form of reverse engineering to 
study or examine a computer program for the purpose of 
making a compatible product might not be a fair use.184  The 
court’s subsequent holding in Sony Computer Entertainment, 
Inc. v. Connectix Corp. eliminated the confusion surrounding 
the legality of the commercial use of information gathered 
 
 178. See id. at 607-08. 
 179. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 608. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 608 n.11. 
 182. 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 183. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1520. 
 184. The confusion regarding the exact limits of the Ninth Circuit’s holding 
in Sega is evident in the district court’s decision in this case.  See Sony 
Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp.2d 1212, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 
1999). 
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during reverse engineering of a computer program.  As a 
consequence, the protection of the non-functional, creative 
elements of computer programs has been left intact but the 
software industry may continue to use reverse engineering to 
aid in its development of compatible products without the 
worry of facing liability for copyright infringement. 
 
III.   ANALYSIS 
 
In order to analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sony 
Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., one must 
apply copyright law and the fair use doctrine to the facts of  the 
case. 
The first step is to determine whether the Sony BIOS falls 
under the protection of the copyright law.  The object code185 of 
the Sony BIOS undoubtedly is protected by copyright as 
expression,186 because the Copyright Act does not “require that 
a work be directly accessible to humans in order to be eligible 
for copyright protection.”187  The functional elements of the 
BIOS, likewise, undoubtedly fall outside the scope of copyright 
protection.188  Under the Copyright Act, “society is free to 
exploit facts, ideas, processes, or methods of operation in a 
copyrighted work.”189  In order “[t]o protect processes or 
methods of operation, a creator must look to patent laws,” 
rather than copyright laws.190  Since the object code, wherein 
the functional aspects of the program lie, cannot be read by 
humans, the “unprotected ideas and functions of the code . . . 
are frequently undiscoverable in the absence of investigation 
and translation that may require copying the copyrighted 
material.”191  In the process of reverse engineering to examine 
the unprotected portions of a software program, an 
intermediate copy of the computer program must normally be 
 
 185. Object code is the binary code of the computer program that the 
computer “runs” when it executes the program.  Object code cannot be read by 
humans.  See  Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 
602 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 186. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). 
 187. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1519. 
 188. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). 
 189. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 842 (Fed. 
Cir. 1992). 
 190. See id. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 159-64 (1989)). 
 191. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 602. 
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made in computer memory.  The Copyright Act seems to 
encompass and proscribe such intermediate copying,192 and 
such intermediate copying may constitute copyright 
infringement even when the end product did not itself contain 
copyrighted material.193  However, the question of whether the 
intermediate copying of a computer program is infringement is 
not completely clear based solely on the text of the Copyright 
Act, and as a result the question has been answered on a case-
by-case basis. 
Intermediate copying may be protected as a fair use if it 
was necessary to gain access to the functional elements of the 
software itself.194  This is due to the fact that “the Copyright Act 
permits an individual in rightful possession of a copy of a work 
to undertake necessary efforts to understand the work’s ideas, 
processes, and methods of operation.”195  Therefore, where there 
is a legitimate reason for a developer to study or examine the 
unprotected functional aspects of a copyrighted program and 
there are no other means to do so, the disassembly of the 
program and the making of the intermediate copies must be 
analyzed under the fair use doctrine.196  In order to determine 
whether the use of a copyrighted work was fair, one must 
consider the four statutory factors set forth in Section 107: 
 (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational 
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted 
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work.197 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 192. See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1518. 
 193. See id. at 1519. 
 194. See id. at 1527. 
 195. Atari Games, 975 F.2d at 842. 
 196. See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1527-28. 
 197. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). 
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A.  THE PURPOSE AND CHARACTER OF THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED  
 SOFTWARE IN A PROCESS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING DURING  
 THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMPATIBLE PROGRAMS SUPPORTS A  
 FINDING OF FAIR USE. 
 
The first statutory factor that must be considered in a fair 
use analysis is the purpose and character of the use.198  The 
question under this factor is whether Connectix’s Virtual Game 
Station “merely ‘supersedes the objects’ of the original creation, 
or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the first with new expression, 
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to 
what extent the new work is ‘transformative’.”199 
In its analysis of this factor in Sony Computer 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., the Ninth Circuit 
neglected to consider the preamble to Section 107, but the 
omission was not a major fault in its analysis.  The preamble 
lists uses “such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching 
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or 
research” as being potential fair uses.200  It is possible that 
Connectix’s intermediate copies of Sony’s BIOS could be 
considered copies made for research purposes since the copies 
were made to determine how the program functioned.  
However, the categories listed in the preamble of Section 107 
seem to be based on activities in which the user of the work 
expects little commercial return on the user’s use of the 
material.  In contrast, Connectix’s use of Sony’s BIOS was to 
develop a commercial product that was compatible with the 
Sony BIOS.  Therefore, Connectix expected to receive an 
indirect commercial return from its use of Sony’s BIOS during 
the development of the Virtual Game Station.  This seems to 
mitigate against a determination that Connectix’s use falls 
under the categories espoused in the preamble to Section 107.  
However, the categories listed in the preamble “have an 
‘illustrative and not limitative’ function”201 and the uses listed 
in the preamble “provide only general guidance about the sorts 
of copying that courts and Congress most commonly had found 
 
 198. See id. § 107(1) (2000). 
 199. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 200. See Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 n.1 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 201. Id. 
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to be fair uses.”202  Therefore, whether or not Connectix’s use is 
a fair use is not determined by the consideration of the 
categories listed in the preamble, despite the fact the categories 
seem to slightly weigh against a finding of fair use. 
The next step in the analysis of the purpose and character 
of Connectix’s use of Sony’s BIOS for purposes of the fair use 
defense is to consider: (1) whether the use was productive; (2) 
whether the use was commercial; and (3) whether Connectix’s 
conduct was proper.203  The Ninth Circuit also neglected to 
directly undertake this portion of the purpose and character 
analysis.  However, the Court did, in effect, consider the first 
two sub-factors because it considered whether the Virtual 
Game Station was transformative and considered Connectix’s 
commercial use of Sony’s BIOS.204  The Court did not consider 
whether Connectix’s conduct was proper. 
A productive use of a copyrighted work is a use that 
“result[s] in some added benefit to the public beyond that 
produced by the first author’s work.”205  In Connectix’s case, the 
Ninth Circuit correctly found that the Virtual Game Station 
was a transformative, and therefore productive, work.206  
Although both programs have similar uses and functions, the 
Virtual Game Station is an entirely new product that does not 
include any code contained in Sony’s BIOS.  The Virtual Game 
Station allows players of PlayStation games to play games on 
an entirely new platform, the personal computer, which would 
be unavailable without the Virtual Game Station.  Therefore, 
the Virtual Game Station is not a direct substitute for the 
PlayStation, although it certainly is a competitor, as it would 
be had Connectix’s engineers directly copied Sony’s BIOS and 
made a PlayStation console clone.  In addition, the 
development of the Virtual Game Station involved a great deal 
of creativity on the part of Connectix’s engineers to write a 
program that allowed PlayStation games to be played on a 
computer with components that vary widely from computer to 
computer as opposed to a PlayStation console that contains a 
 
 202. Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Group, 150 F.3d 132, 141 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 203. See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 916 (D.Mass. 
1993). 
 204. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606-607. 
 205. Rubin, 836 F.Supp. at 916 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal 
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 478 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
 206. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606. 
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set type of hardware that does not vary from console to console.  
Overall, Connectix’s productive use of Sony’s BIOS, though not 
determinative, strongly favors a finding of fair use.207 
Connectix admitted that its engineers disassembled Sony’s 
code not just to study the concepts, but to actually use the code 
in the development of the Virtual Game Station.208  In 
Connectix’s case it was clear that the use was intended to be 
commercial—the development of the Virtual Game Station was 
a commercial endeavor.  However, a commercial purpose of the 
use of a copyrighted work does not alone defeat a fair use 
defense to copyright infringement action209 and does not make 
the use presumptively unfair as the district court held.210  The 
Supreme Court directly rejected this type of presumption in 
Campbell and therefore the application of such a presumption 
to fair use analysis in any case is inappropriate.211  In other 
words, the commercial nature of Connectix’s use of Sony’s BIOS 
cannot be given dispositive weight in the fair use analysis.212  A 
commercial purpose of the use does tend “to weigh against a 
finding of fair use” and therefore Connectix’s commercial 
purpose in its use of Sony’s BIOS tends to favor Sony.213  Where 
the use of the copyrighted work was an intermediate one only, 
“any commercial ‘exploitation’ was indirect or derivative” and 
the commercial use weighs less heavily against a finding of fair 
use.214   
The crux of the commercial and non-commercial use 
distinction is “not whether the sole motive of the use is 
monetary gain but whether the user stands to profit from 
exploitation of the copyrighted material without paying the 
customary price.”215  Connectix, however, did not directly 
 
 207. See Rubin, 836 F.Supp. at 916 (citing Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. 
v. Nation Enters., 471, 561 U.S. 539 (1985)). 
 208. See  Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp.2d 
1212, 1220 (N.D. Cal. 1999). 
 209. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 
724 F.2d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing Triangle Publications, Inc. v. 
Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 210. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590-91 (1994). 
 211. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606 (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. 
at 585). 
 212. See DSC Communications Corp. v. DGI Tech., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1183, 
1189 (N.D. Tex. 1995) (citing Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585). 
 213. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585. 
 214. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
 215. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
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exploit Sony’s BIOS.  Connectix merely used Sony’s BIOS to 
examine the way that the program functioned so that it could 
develop a compatible product on its own.  Without the ability to 
study Sony’s BIOS for the purpose of determining how its 
functional elements work, Connectix would be unable to 
develop a compatible product and would have given Sony a de 
facto monopoly over the functional elements of its BIOS for as 
long as its copyright lasted.  A monopoly over functional 
elements such as this is directly opposed to the ultimate aim of 
copyright law “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 
public good.”216  In order to receive such protection of the 
functional elements of its BIOS, Sony must seek protection 
under the more stringent requirements of patent law rather 
than copyright law.  As a result, Connectix’s commercial 
purpose in its use of Sony’s BIOS tends to weigh against a 
finding of fair use, but only marginally so due to the offsetting 
effect of the public policy ramifications that would result from 
such a finding. 
The final sub-factor of the purpose and character of use 
analysis is whether Connectix’s conduct was proper.  This sub-
factor turns largely upon whether Connectix acted in bad faith 
when it copied Sony’s BIOS.217  Connectix copied Sony’s BIOS in 
a good faith effort to develop its own product.  Connectix did 
not literally copy Sony’s code into its own product, but rather 
only observed the operation of Sony’s BIOS to discover how it 
functioned.  Connectix approached Sony during its development 
of the Virtual Games Station in order to request technical 
assistance, and thereby avoid making intermediate copies of 
Sony’s BIOS, but Sony declined the request.218  Sony also does 
not make the information regarding the BIOS of the 
PlayStation available to the public.219  As a result, Connectix 
had no other way to access unprotected functional elements of 
Sony’s BIOS that did not involve intermediate copying.  Despite 
the fact that Sony denied Connectix permission to make 
intermediate copies of its BIOS and Connectix made 
intermediate copies on its own, this does not favor a finding 
 
562 (1985) (citing Roy Exp. Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 
503 F. Supp. 1137, 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)). 
 216. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
432 (1984). 
 217. See Rubin v. Brooks/Cole Pub. Co., 836 F. Supp. 909, 918-19 (D. Mass. 
1993). 
 218. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 601. 
 219. See id. at 600. 
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that Connectix acted improperly, nor does it preclude a finding 
of fair use.220  Therefore, this sub-factor favors Connectix. 
Overall, there is one sub-factor that strongly favors 
Connectix, one sub-factor that merely favors Connectix, and 
one sub-factor that weakly favors Sony.  These sub-factors, 
together with the preamble, which slightly favors Sony, weigh 
toward a finding that the purpose and character factor of the 
fair use analysis favors Connectix.  Therefore, the Ninth 
Circuit correctly determined that the purpose and character of 
Connectix’s use favored a finding of fair use. 
 
B.   DUE TO THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE, THE  
 PROCESS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING DURING THE  
 DEVELOPMENT OF COMPATIBLE PROGRAMS IS FAIR USE,  
 PARTICULARLY WHEN UNPROTECTED FUNCTIONAL ELEMENTS  
 CANNOT BE ACCESSED WITHOUT COPYING. 
 
The second statutory factor concerns whether Sony’s BIOS 
is primarily creative as opposed to informational or 
functional.221  The defense of fair use has been given a greater 
reach when the work copied is informational in nature.222  
Factual works, such as biographies, reviews, factual 
compilations, criticism, and commentary, are “believed to have 
a greater public value and, therefore, uses of them may be 
better tolerated by the copyright law.”223  Since Sony’s BIOS is 
primarily a functional work, albeit with some expressive 
elements such as its overall structure and specific object and 
source code, the BIOS would seem to fall toward the ‘factual’ 
end of the copyright spectrum and would be protected by a 
‘thin’ copyright.  When the nature of the work requires 
intermediate copying to understand ideas and processes in the 
copyrighted work, that nature supports intermediate copying 
as a fair use; thus, “reverse engineering of object code to discern 
unprotected ideas in a computer program is a fair use.”224  To 
 
 220. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 221. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 
1536 (C.D. Cal. 1985). 
 222. See id. 
 223. See Basic Books, Inc. v. Kinko’s Graphics Corp., 758 F. Supp. 1522, 
1532-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (citing Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 
96 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
 224. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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the extent that the copyrighted work is “functional or factual, it 
may be copied, as may those expressive elements of the work 
that ‘must necessarily be used as incident to’ expression of the 
underlying ideas, functional concepts, or facts.”225  Connectix 
could not gain access to the unprotected elements of Sony’s 
BIOS without copying it.226  There was little publicly available 
technical information about the functionality of the Sony BIOS.  
Sony’s BIOS was also an operating system which did not 
produce a screen display as a result of its functioning, 
precluding the opportunity to determine how it functioned 
based on screen displays.227  Therefore, in order to gain access 
to the functional elements of the BIOS it was necessary for 
Connectix to access the elements through some form of reverse 
engineering that required intermediate copies of the BIOS to be 
made.228  The nature of Sony’s BIOS and the resulting difficulty 
in accessing unprotected elements of the software program 
cause this factor to favor Connectix. 
 
C.   ALTHOUGH THE REVERSE ENGINEERING OF SOFTWARE MAY  
 REQUIRE THE COPYING OF AN ENTIRE PROGRAM, THE USE OF  
 THE COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL IS FAIR IF THE COPYING WAS  
 NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND THE UNPROTECTED ELEMENTS  
 OF THE PROGRAM AND THE FINAL PRODUCT DOES NOT  
 CONTAIN COPIED CODE. 
 
The third statutory factor considers the amount of Sony’s 
BIOS copied by Connectix and the substantiality of the portion 
copied.229  The amount of Sony’s BIOS copied by Connectix is 
clear; the entire BIOS was copied during the process of reverse 
engineering and was copied multiple times.230  However, 
“translation of a program from object code into source code 
cannot be accomplished without making copies of the code.”231  
 
 225. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 
1992) (citing citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-04 (1879) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted)). 
 226. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 603. 
 227. See id. 
 228. See id. 
 229. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2000). 
 230. See Sony Computer Entm’t, 203 F.3d at 606. 
 231. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 
1992). 
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Even the copying of an entire work does not preclude fair use,232 
although it does weigh against finding of fair use.233  The 
substantiality of the portion of Sony’s BIOS is also clear; since 
the entire program was copied, and when an entire computer 
software program is copied, there is no doubt that protected 
elements of the software were copied.234  Therefore, this factor 
favors Sony.  However, in a case of intermediate infringement 
where the final product does not contain infringing material, 
this factor is of “very little weight.”235 
In the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the amount and 
substantiality of Sony’s BIOS copied by Connectix, the Court 
neglected to address several important issues that, although 
not important in the instant case, may be important in future 
applications of the Court’s decision.  The fair use reproductions 
of a computer program made during activities such as reverse 
engineering “must not exceed what is necessary to understand 
the unprotected elements of the work.”236  In Connectix’s case, 
the reverse engineering of Sony’s BIOS required the copying of 
the entire program to complete the process.  Therefore, 
Connectix copied no more than was required to understand the 
unprotected elements of the work.  The second issue not 
addressed by the court is that “[a]ny reproduction of protectable 
expression must be strictly necessary to ascertain the bounds of 
protected information within the work.”237  Again, since the 
copying of the entire BIOS was necessary during the process of 
reverse engineering, the reproduction of the protected elements 
of the program was necessary to determine the protected and 
functional portions of the program.  Because the court chose not 
to address these issues, the court’s holding may be interpreted 
by some to be far broader than it should be.  Some may 
interpret the court’s holding as supporting the proposition that 
any copying during the process of reverse engineering, whether 
necessary to access the unprotected elements of the program or 
not, is a fair use.  Based upon this proposition, some developers 
 
 232. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
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may resort to the copying of a program during the process of 
reverse engineering, even when the copying is not necessary to 
access unprotected elements of the program, and infringe upon 
the copyright of the program.  If this occurs, there would be yet 
another round of litigation to determine the bounds of the 
Ninth Circuit’s holding that could have just as easily be 
established in the instant case.  Although neither of these 
issues would have changed the outcome of the instant case, the 
Ninth Circuit missed an opportunity to clarify the limits of its 
holding of fair use and, as a result, issues such as these may 
come before the court at a later date. 
 
D.  THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE TO DEVELOP A  
 COMPATIBLE PRODUCT THROUGH REVERSE ENGINEERING  
 DOES NOT HAVE AN ADVERSE EFFECT UPON THE POTENTIAL  
 MARKET FOR OR VALUE OF THE COPYRIGHTED WORK, ASIDE  
 FROM THE EFFECTS THAT RESULT FROM ANY KIND OF  
 COMPETITION IN THE MARKETPLACE. 
 
The final statutory factor is the effect of the use upon the 
potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.238  The 
final statutory factor takes into account not only the extent of 
market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged 
infringer, but also “whether unrestricted and widespread 
conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would 
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential 
market” for the original.239  This factor is “the single most 
important element of fair use.”240  The potential for harm to 
Sony’s BIOS arises if Connectix’s use would tend to diminish 
the sales of Sony’s work, interfere with its marketability, or 
fulfill the demand for the original.241 If the production of 
PlayStation emulators became widespread, the market for the 
Sony PlayStation may become less lucrative.  However, the fact 
 
 238. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4). 
 239. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994) 
(quoting M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 13.05[A][4], at 
13-102.61 (1993)). 
 240. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
566 (1985) (citing M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, § 
13.05[A], at 13-76 (1984)). 
 241. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 1526, 
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that the emulators are not, contrary to the finding of the 
district court,242 direct substitutes for the PlayStation console, 
since they run PlayStation games on a completely new 
platform, would mean that it is unlikely that the widespread 
production of emulators would have a “substantially adverse 
impact on the potential market.”243  The adverse impact 
suffered by the market for Sony PlayStation consoles would be 
no different than the effect of the introduction of competition 
into any other market and in fact would probably be less since 
the PlayStation console and emulators are not direct 
competitors.244  In other words, Connectix’s Virtual Game 
Station does not merely supplant the Sony PlayStation console, 
but instead is transformative and competes with the 
PlayStation console in the market for platforms upon which 
PlayStation games may be played.  There is a presumption that 
market harm will occur when there is direct duplication for a 
commercial purpose, but that is not the case with Connectix’s 
use of Sony’s BIOS; thus, there is no presumption or inference 
of market harm that is applicable to the instant case.245  
Therefore, the first part of the market effect factor favors 
Connectix. 
Analysis of the effect on the market for a copyrighted work 
also requires a balancing of the benefit that the public will 
derive if use is permitted against the personal gain that the 
copyright owner will receive if the use is denied.246  In this case, 
the public benefit if the use is permitted is great—a whole new 
class of platforms for PlayStation games will open up and be 
available for use by fans of PlayStation games.  On the other 
hand, the personal gain that Sony will receive if use is denied is 
a gain of an unprecedented level of protection for its software 
products.  “If disassembly of copyrighted object code is per se an 
unfair use, the owner of the copyright gains a de facto 
monopoly over the functional aspects of his work—aspects that 
 
 242. See Sony Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 48 F. Supp. 2d 
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were expressly denied copyright protection by Congress.”247  The 
functional elements of Sony’s software would effectively be 
protected by copyright law,  if a finding of fair use was denied.  
This is due to the fact that the functional aspects of Sony’s 
BIOS can only be accessed through the reverse engineering and 
study of the software, which due to the type of software, 
necessarily entails copying that would be prevented by 
copyright law.  In order for Sony “to enjoy a lawful monopoly 
over the idea or functional principle underlying a work, [Sony] 
must satisfy the more stringent standards imposed by the 
patent laws.”248  Therefore, the balancing of the benefit that the 
public will derive if the use is permitted against the personal 
gain that the copyright owner will receive if the use is denied 
tends to favor Connectix. 
Based on the two methods of analysis under the final 
statutory factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market 
for, or value of, the copyrighted work, this factor favors 
Connectix. 
 
E. THE PUBLIC BENEFIT THAT RESULTS FROM THE FRUITS OF  
 REVERSE ENGINEERING AND THE ULTIMATE PURPOSE OF  
 COPYRIGHT LAW MAKE THE USE OF COPYRIGHTED SOFTWARE  
 DURING THE PROCESS OF REVERSE ENGINEERING A FAIR USE. 
 
The public policy ramifications of a finding of or denial of 
fair use must be a consideration in fair use analysis because 
the ultimate purpose of copyright law is to benefit the public, 
through the distribution of knowledge, rather than the 
author.249  The ultimate aim of the Copyright Act is “to 
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”250  The 
temporary monopoly created by copyright law is designed to 
benefit the public as a whole, rather than to reward individual 
authors.251  Therefore, the effect on the public benefit of a denial 
of fair use must be considered.  In this case, the benefit the 
 
 247. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 
1992) (citing 17 U.S.C. 102(b)). 
 248. See id. (citing Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 
141, 159-64 (1989)). 
 249. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 
546 (1985). 
 250. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 
432 (1984). 
 251. See id. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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public will receive if the use of a copyrighted program in the 
development of compatible products is permitted is great—the 
inability to develop compatible products would seriously 
disrupt the computer industry and greatly increase the 
development costs of computer products.  In a time where there 
are a great multitude of hardware and software manufacturers, 
the compatibility of software with other software and across the 
many computer platforms that are available is integral to the 
effective and efficient use of computers.  In addition, a finding 
that a use such as Connectix’s is not fair would do a great 
disservice to the public because Sony, and any other developer 
producing software with strong functional elements, would 
receive an unprecedented level of protection for its software 
products.  Under such a finding, both the expressive and 
functional elements of Sony’s software would effectively be 
protected by copyright law.  This is due to the fact that the 
functional aspects of Sony’s BIOS can only be accessed through 
the reverse engineering and study of the software, which 
necessarily entails copying that would be prevented by such a 
finding.  Without the ability to study copyrighted software to 
determine how its functional elements work, other developers 
would be unable to develop compatible products.  Therefore, a 
finding that the use of copyrighted software in the process of 
reverse engineering is unlawful would give the software owner 
a de facto monopoly over the functional elements of its program 
for as long as its copyright lasted.  A monopoly over functional 
elements such as this is directly opposed to the ultimate aim of 
copyright law “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general 
public good.”252  In order for an author of a software program “to 
enjoy a lawful monopoly over the idea or functional principle 
underlying a work, [the author] must satisfy the more stringent 
standards imposed by the patent laws.”253  Due to the 
ramifications of the granting of a de facto monopoly over 
functional elements of computer programs to copyright owners, 
in direct opposition to the purposes of copyright law, public 
policy strongly supports a finding of fair use in situations in 
which copying of a program during reverse engineering is 
necessary to access unprotected functional elements of the 
program. 
 
 
 252. See id. at 432. 
 253. See Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1526. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
The Ninth Circuit correctly found that three of the 
statutory fair use factors favored Connectix, while one favored 
Sony and that factor was “of little weight” because the final 
product contained no infringing code.254  The court correctly 
held that the “intermediate copies made and used by Connectix 
during the course of its reverse engineering of the Sony BIOS 
were protected [by] fair use, necessary to permit Connectix to 
make its non-infringing Virtual Game Station function with 
PlayStation games.”255  This holding reiterated and clarified the 
Ninth Circuit’s previous decision in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. 
Accolade, Inc.256 which held that “[w]here there is good reason 
for studying or examining the unprotected aspects of a 
copyrighted computer program, disassembly for purposes of 
such study or examination constitutes a fair use.”257  The 
holding in Sega arguably did not cover cases in which the user 
utilized disassembly or an equivalent form of reverse 
engineering to study or examine a computer program for the 
purpose of using the gathered information to make their own 
compatible product.258  The Ninth Circuit’s holding in the 
instant case eliminated some of the confusion surrounding the 
legality of the commercial use of information gathered during 
reverse engineering of a computer program caused by the 
court’s decision in Sega.  This holding correctly extends fair use 
protection far enough to protect the use of reverse engineering 
to produce compatible products and to prevent software 
developers from gaining de facto monopoly over the functional 
aspects of their work.  However, the holding misses an 
opportunity to correctly limit the application of the decision 
only to cases in which the making of intermediate copies of a 
software program during reverse engineering is necessary to 
access unprotected elements and there is no other way to do so.  
This omission is likely to result in a future round of litigation 
designed to determine the applicability and the bounds of the 
necessity requirement in the use of reverse engineering of other 
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types of software. 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in Sony Computer 
Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp. is an appropriate 
application of the fair use doctrine to the reverse engineering of 
computer software.  As a result of the court’s ruling, a process 
that was already widely used within the software industry was 
decided to be a fair use of copyrighted material.  The protection 
of the non-functional, creative elements of computer programs 
has been left intact by the Ninth Circuit’s holding, but the 
software industry may continue to use reverse engineering to 
aid in its development of compatible products without worry of 
facing liability for copyright infringement.  Therefore, the 
holding of the court in Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. 
Connectix Corp. correctly balances these competing interests of 
software developers and the public. 
 

